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Abstract—Recent works showed the vulnerability of image
classifiers to adversarial attacks in the digital domain. However,
the majority of attacks involve adding small perturbation to an
image to fool the classifier. Unfortunately, such procedures can
not be used to conduct a real-world attack, where adding an
adversarial attribute to the photo is a more practical approach.
In this paper, we study the problem of real-world attacks on
face recognition systems. We examine security of one of the best
public face recognition systems, LResNet100E-IR with ArcFace
loss, and propose a simple method to attack it in the physical
world. The method suggests creating an adversarial patch that
can be printed, added as a face attribute and photographed;
the photo of a person with such attribute is then passed to
the classifier such that the classifier’s recognized class changes
from correct to the desired one. Proposed generating procedure
allows projecting adversarial patches not only on different areas
of the face, such as nose or forehead but also on some wearable
accessory, such as eyeglasses.
Index Terms—adversarial patch, face recognition, physical
domain, ArcFace.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last years, much of research was done in the field of
attacks on face recognition systems. Nowadays, one of the best
face recognition systems to test different attacking approaches
is LResNet100E-IR with special additive angular margin loss,
ArcFace. The network maps an image to a feature vector
such that intra-class distance tends to be small and inter-class
distance stays large. In the original paper [1] it is observed
that the accuracy in classification problems of this network is
comparable to state-of-the-art models.
Although deep neural networks are efficient in image clas-
sification, they are vulnerable to adversarial samples [2].
Majority of prior works has focused on exploiting such vulner-
abilities through imperceptible changes of an image, which are
constrained by some norm, e.g. L1, L2, L∞. In such cases,
an attacker is trying to fool classifier but at the same time
keeps perceptual similarity between original and adversarial
images. Later the authors of [3] succeeded in localizing of
image changes. They generated the patch that can be placed
anywhere within the field of view of a classifier and managed
to conduct an attack in the real world.
Attack on face recognition neural network is more complex
in comparison to attack on just image classifier. It is known for
a long time that several areas on a face influence classification
more than the others [4]. So, the result of classification of the
photo with an adversarial patch depends on an area where the
patch is located.
Authors of [5] investigated the possibility to construct an
attack inconspicuous for the human eye. They managed to
conduct an attack in the real world with the use of eyeglasses
as an adversarial attribute. These glasses were constructed
to impersonate a person, but were designed for the face of
attacker with a fixed orientation of his head.
In [6] the problem of dodging the open face recognition
system, ArcFace, was studied. Authors proposed an attack by
generating a colored patch that may be placed on a hat and
lead to incorrect work of the network in online scenario in
physical world.
The goal of this paper is to make a starting point in the
improvement of the security of the open face recognition
system, ArcFace. Our approach is to explore its vulnerability
to adversarial attacks and mislead the network using the
proposed method. It should be mentioned that the network
and its weights are available on the Internet and the adversarial
attack approach is considered as well-known, so the research
conducted does not violate any regulations.
The outline of current research is presented below:
• A simple adversarial patch generation procedure is pro-
posed;
• The procedure allows to project adversarial patch on
different surfaces on a face;
• Effectiveness of adversarial patches placed on different
positions on the face was studied;
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• A real-world attack on one of the best public face
recognition systems with the use of this procedure is
conducted;
• The attacking pipeline can be easily implemented since
the gained patch is a gray-scale image.
II. THE MAIN CONCEPT AND RELATED WORKS
In this section, we describe a concept of adversarial attacks
and present an overview of methods and techniques which are
often used in the physical domain.
A. The concept of adversarial attacks
An adversarial attack on face recognition is a technique
to fool some recognition system through a change in input
such that the output of the system changes from correct to
another one. Although adversarial attack may be conducted
in the digital domain (where the input to the classifier may
be changed, for example, pixel-wise), it is much harder to
construct such an attack in the physical world. However, in
[5], [7], it was shown that it is possible with the efficiency
comparable to the one in the digital domain.
There are several possible classifications of adversarial
attacks on face recognition systems (i.e. on classifiers). One
way is to determine how the output class should change:
• targeted attack – the adversary changes the output clas-
sification of input to the desired one;
• untargeted attack – the adversary leads to misclassifica-
tion of input.
In [8], the classification of attacks based on what is known
about the neural network is provided. In white-box attacks,
parameters of the model, as well as its structure and training
procedure, are known. In contrast, in black-box scenarios, none
of the above is known.
B. Related works
In recent years, much research had been done in the field
of attacks in the physical domain.
In [9], one of the most straightforward attacking approaches,
Fast Gradient Sign Method, FGSM, was proposed. This
method refers to generating of adversarial examples through
adding to the initial image the perturbation
η = εsign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)), (1)
where θ is vector of parameters of the model, x is input to
the model, y are the targets associated with x and J(θ, x, y)
is the cost function used to train the neural network. Note that
in case of targeted attack, y are desired targets and ε < 0 and
in case of untargeted attack, y are incorrect targets and ε > 0.
In [10], it was discovered that adding the momentum term
into the iterative process for attacks lead to more stable opti-
mization trajectory. It is determined that adversarial examples
generated with the iterative method with the use of momentum
are more suitable for white-box attacks than the ones generated
without the use of momentum.
In [11], the question of the robustness of adversarial ex-
amples under real-world image transformations was studied,
and Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) algorithm was
proposed. This algorithm helps to generate an adversarial
example taking into account a set of transformations which
usually spoils the transferability of an image to the real-world.
Given the distance function ρ : X×X → R, distance bound
ε, set of transformations T and yadv as desired adversarial
classes corresponding to x, EOT approach may be formulated
as the following optimization problem:
Xadv = argmax
z
Et∈T
[
P(yadv|t(x+ z))
]
, (2)
such that Et∈T
[
ρ(x + z, x)
]
< ε and x + z ∈ [0, 1]d.
In this formulation z ∈ [0, 1]d is an additive noise. This
approach helps to imitate such transformations as camera noise
or viewpoint shifts.
The most similar research to ours was conducted in [6]. In
contrast, there was used different EoT approach as well as
patch structure and its position. More than that, we used not
colored, but black and white patches.
III. METHODOLOGY
It should be mentioned that usually face recognition process
in the real world consists of two sequential parts. Firstly, the
image of a person is passed to face detection neural network,
which obtains a bounding box with a face. Secondly, the
obtained bounding box is passed to the classifying neural
network, LResNet100E-Ir in our case. Nowadays, there is a va-
riety of face detection neural networks. In our experiments, we
use the multi-task cascaded CNN based framework (MTCCN),
proposed in [12].
In this paper, we propose a pipeline to generate a broad
class of adversarial patches, which can fool white-box models
and should be fitted for a given person. In this section, we
describe the proposed pipeline and give a detailed explanation
of each stage.
The attacking strategy may be explained as a sequence of
the following steps:
• choose desired patch location and its shape,
• print patch with a chessboard pattern and apply it on a
face or wearable attribute,
• take a photo of your face and mark corners of the
chessboard on a photo,
• repeat steps mentioned before to get photos with different
head rotations,
• project adversarial patch on the chessboard pattern,
• get facial landmarks using face detector (MTCNN),
• warp image to standard 112 × 112 ArcFace input using
similarity transformation and obtained landmarks,
• solve the corresponding optimization problem.
A. Projective transformation and chessboard pattern
1) Non-linear 2d transformation: To approximate non-
linear 2d transformation, we apply projective transformation
separately to each cell of the chessboard grid. Regular grid
G = {Gi} of pixels Gi = (xti, yti) forming output map.
(xti, y
t
i) denotes chessboard sticker’s coordinates on the photo.
By four corner pixels of j’th chessboard cell and correspond-
ing four marked pixels of projected cell we can obtain Mθj
matrix of spatial transformation, so sampling points of j’th
cell:
(
xsij
ysij
)
= Tθj
(
Gij
)
= Mθj
 xtiyti
1
 , (3)
where (xsi , y
s
i ) are the source coordinates in the input map,
they define the spatial location in the adversarial patch where
sampling kernel is applied to get the output map. Given the
expression above, the target grid for the adversarial patch is
obtained as a union of target coordinates of each cell:
(
xsi
ysi
)
= {Tθj (Gij )} (4)
To speed up the training procedure, we should precalculate
and store sampling points. Next step is differentiable image
sampling. In more details, this procedure described in [13].
Scheme of transformations is illustrated in Fig. 1.
θ
Grid 
generator
Projective transformation Sampler
𝒯θ(𝐺)
Fig. 1. Procedure of adversarial sticker application.
2) Linear 2d transformation: In case when the application
of adversarial patch could be simulated by a linear transfor-
mation (e.g. in case of eyeglasses), we repeat steps mentioned
in the previous section just for one cell.
B. Similarity transform and face detector
MTCNN face detection system finds facial landmarks,
which are then used to obtain a matrix of similarity trans-
formation Aφ and sampling points Tφ(G′) for this warp.
The main reason why it is necessary to apply sticker before
similarity transformation is image sampling. Sampling kernel
takes values of neighbouring pixels and copies one of them
or return averaged value. Application patch after similarity
transformation tends to inconsistent values of pixels on the
boundaries of the patch.
C. Loss function and training procedure
The goal of the attack is to generate adversarial patch
which can not only mislead face recognition system but also
should be good-looking. We formulate the second objective
by restricting neighbouring pixels to have a similar colour.
We obtain the adversarial sticker minimizing the following
objective function:
L(X, p) = Ladv(X, p) + τTV (p), p ∈ [0, 1]m×n – patch,
(5)
where X is a batch of photos of the attacker with different
shooting conditions (i.e. set of transforms T described above)
and total variation loss, or TV loss, preserve high perceptual
quality and ensures that the difference between neighbouring
pixels is imperceptible [14], as far as photos taken from the
camera do not have tremendous shift in values of neighbouring
pixels.
TV loss is the function of pixel values of a patch p and is
defined as follows:
TV (p) =
∑
i,j
√(
pi,j − pi,j+1
)2
+
(
pi,j − pi+1,j
)2
(6)
Ladv is the cosine similarity loss that minimizes the similar-
ity between an embedding of the photo with patch and initial
embedding of the person. This term depends on type of attack.
In case of untargeted attack:
Ladv(X, p) = Et∈T,x∈X
[
− cos(ext , e)
]
, (7)
where x is a photo from batch X corresponding to some
shooting condition, e is ground truth embedding of attacker.
In case of targeted attack:
Ladv(X, p) = Et∈T,x∈X
[
cos(ext , ex′)
]
, (8)
where ex′ is an embedding corresponding to desired person
or to the closest class except for ground truth class.
Here ext is an embedding corresponding to the photo xt
of attacker with applied patch. Procedure of patch application
may be denoted in a following way. Given a sampler function
A, photo x and corresponding grid Tθ(G), xt denotes image
with applied patch:
xt = A(x, t(p), Tθ(G)). (9)
It should be mentioned that all the operations described
above are differentiable. According to [10], gradients through
this iterations ∇pL(X, p) are accumulated. Given decay factor
µ,
g := µg +
∇pL(X, p)
‖∇pL(X, p)‖1 (10)
and patch p is updated as follows:
p := p− ε sign(g). (11)
LResNet
MI-FGSM
Sampler Sampler
𝒯θ(𝐺) 𝒯ϕ(𝐺′)
Fig. 2. Attacking pipeline
The whole attacking pipeline is presented in Fig 2.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe settings of experiments and its
technical details.
A. Data preprocessing
As a part of the experimental setup, we used pretrained
LResNet100E-IR to collect embeddings of different people.
For this purpose, we use first 200 classes from CASIA-
WebFace [15] dataset and photos of the 1st and the 2nd authors
as images of attackers.
B. Setup of experiments
It should be mentioned that solving the optimization prob-
lem described in the previous section implies patch optimiza-
tion in the whole RGB colour space. However, colour triplets
of the patch in digital space differ significantly from the ones
of the printed patch because of the printer’s narrow colour
spectrum. More than that, triplets change one more time when
the printed patch is photographed on camera. Due to these
issues, we decided to use not a colour but a grayscale patch.
It was discovered that iterative FGSM method with mo-
mentum works good in the digital domain, but gradient step
size ε, decay factor µ and weight τ of TV loss affect colours
transition to physical domain dramatically. It was empirically
estimated that values ε = 116 , µ = 0.9 and τ = 1e− 3 during
the training leads to the best results on test in the real world.
In addition, we want to mention that initial similarity with
ground truth class cos(ext , e) is between 0.65 and 0.70 for all
training photos in all three scenarios, whereas initial similarity
with desired class cos(ext , ex′) in targeted attacks is always
below 0.30.
C. Adversarial sticker localization
In this work, we tested the method proposed above to
generate patches for three different areas on the face. For the
diversity, one of the generated patches is an eyeglass; two
others are stickers on nose and forehead.
1) Attacking eyeglasses: In this case, we use a patch of
the form of eyeglasses rim (front view), where the frame
and bridge of eyeglasses are used for adversarial pattern
application. It turned out that the size of these parts is crucial
for the success of the attack. Thus, we decided to use an
eyeglasses model with a big frame and of size 16.5× 6.4 cm.
Example of the adversarial patch of this form is presented in
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. Adversarial eyeglasses
Fig. 4. Example of adversarial eyeglasses
In this scenario, 14 photos were used for training, 3 photos
were used for validation in the digital domain, and 5 photos
were used for the test in the physical domain.
2) Attacking forehead: In this case, we used a rectangular
patch of size 14× 5 cells; the width of one cell is 1.0 cm. It
turned out that the closer patch to eyebrows the better results
in a targeted attack. In this scenario, 4 photos were used for
training, 3 photos were used for validation in digital domain
and 3 photos were used for the test in the physical domain.
The patch of this type is illustrated in Fig. 5 and in Fig. 6.
Fig. 5. Adversarial forehead
Fig. 6. Example of adversarial sticker on forehead
3) Attacking nose: In this case, we used a rectangular patch
of size 12×6 cells; the width of one cell is 0.7 cm. An example
of adversarial sticker is depicted in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. We varied
length in cells of the patch. During experiments, we found out
that the height of the patch less than 6 cell is not enough for
the successful attack even in the digital domain. but it was
found out that increasing of size of patch is not enough for
transferability of attack to the physical domain.
D. Results
In all three above scenarios, training procedure was con-
ducted for 10000 iterations of the method described before.
If on some iteration Ladv(X, p) < 0, training stops and an
obtained patch is printed and tested in the physical world.
Fig. 7. Adversarial nose
Fig. 8. Example of adversarial sticker on nose
Numerical results of the attacks for the first and the second
attacking scenarios are presented in Table I. There we report
the mean similarities ± standard errors of the mean on training
photos xtrain, on validation photos in digital domain xval and
on test photos in physical domain xtest with both ground truth
class and desired class.
E. Discussion
Numerical experiments showed that it is possible to attack
ArcFace in the real world with the use of adversarial stickers
placed on eyeglasses or forehead. Although similarity with
ground truth class cos(extest , e) is just slightly below the
similarity with desired class cos(extest , ex′), it is noticeable
that neural network can not recognize the attacker as ground
truth class. It should be said that the improvement of stability
of the proposed technique to different illumination conditions
may increase the success of the attack.
In addition, it may be mentioned that one of the interesting
outcomes of attack is appearing of sketches of parts of the
face on adversarial patches located in corresponding areas.
More than that, it is discovered that the position of a patch,
as well as its size, dramatically affects the success of attack
in the physical domain. In general, the bigger the patch and
the closer it to eyes, the better the results of attack in the real
world.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a simple method of creating adversarial
patches that can be used to attack state-of-the-art face
recognition systems. Our approach was tested in targeted
and untargeted attacks on FaceID model LResNet100E-IR,
ArcFace@ms1m-refine-v2. In this paper, it was shown that
TABLE I
NUMERICAL RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTS
Patch Type of attack cos(extrain , e) cos(extrain , ex′ ) cos(exval , e) cos(exval , ex′ ) cos(extest , e) cos(extest , ex′ )
Eyeglasses Targeted 0.041 ± 0.052 0.648 ± 0.020 0.317 ± 0.004 0.451 ± 0.021 0.305 ± 0.024 0.363 ± 0.024
Forehead Targeted -0.053 ± 0.009 0.221 ± 0.011 0.273 ± 0.007 0.421 ± 0.025 0.323 ± 0.035 0.391 ± 0.021
a simple and easily reproducible attacking technique leads
to incorrect work of that system not only in the digital
domain but also in the physical world. Experiments show that
further security research should be conducted to improve the
robustness of such networks to attacks of this type. In the
future, we focus on construction and utilization of a defense
technique to make a network invulnerable to such attacks,
especially in the physical world.
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